Training Packages

Learn from the expertise of DMD Solutions’ RAMS Academy experts

Half-Day Package

4 hours of TRAINING

1 training TOPIC 

8 hours of CONSULTING 

Up to 3 participants

3 months Robin Team Subscription

Full-Day Package

8 hours of TRAINING

2 training TOPICS 

16 hours of CONSULTING 

Up to 5 participants

3 months Robin Team Subscription

Two-Day Package

12 hours of TRAINING

3 training TOPICS 

16 hours of CONSULTING 

Up to 5 participants

6 months Robin Team Subscription

DMD Solutions’ RAMS Academy offers Training Packages on RAMS topics which include:

  • RAMS online training with expert speakers and curated training material
  • Access to Robin subscription at a reduced rate for a limited period
  • Consulting credit for technical support in topic related RAMS analyses to be used on request

Training specific topics

Relationship between aerospace design phases and safety engineering analyses

MAIN OBJECTIVES

  • Understand ARP4761 & ARP4754A for real-world applications
  • Learn how to think like Certification Authorities
  • Understand the most-used Safety Assessment Analysis Methods
  • Maximize productivity and efficiency while complying with all the Certification Specifications
  • Learn industry best practices
  • Leverage the experience of 100+ successful concluded projects and +15,000 worked hours in the aerospace industry

 RAMS Overview: ARP4761 & ARP4754 basics

The standard ARP4761 gives an accurate overview and description of the methods for performing the safety assessment for certification of civil aircraft. This document provides a systematic approach to most activities in the field of Reliability, Maintainability and Safety, serving as a backbone to structure a first introduction to RAMS analyses for the aerospace industry.

STRUCTURE
1 Introduction 45min
2 Certification Specifications & Acceptable Means of Compliance 45min
3 Safety Assessment Process 1h
4 Safety Analysis Methods 1h 30min
CONTENT
Introduction

Relationship between ARP4761 & ARP4754A. Feedback from DO-178C and DO-254.

Certification Specifications & Acceptable Means of Compliance
Knowledge of the aerospace industry rules abided by EASA, FAA & ECSS. Required certification targets. Focus can be centred in alumni interests:

  • CS-23, CS-25, CS-27, CS-29
  • CS-LURS, CS-LUAS, SC-VTOL
  • ECSS standards

Safety Assessment Process

Minimum required safety document involved in a Type Certificate or Supplemental Type Certificate: from FHA to SSA. Classification of Failure Conditions according to their severity.

Safety Analysis Methods

Initial overview, description and adequacy of the diverse safety analyses methods available: FTA, Markov Analysis, Dependence Diagram, FMEA, FMES, Zonal Safety Analysis, Particular Risk Analysis, and Common Mode Analysis

ACTIVITIES

ACTIVITY 1: Development of a Functional Hazard Assessment for an ATA 24 (Electrical) System*

*The example system can be adapted to students’ industry and requirements on previous request

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Basic

  • ARP4761: Guidelines and methods for conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil
    airborne systems and equipment
  • ARP4754A: Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems

Auxiliary

  • DO-178C: Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification
  • DO-254: Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware
Relationship between aerospace design phases and safety engineering analyses

MAIN OBJECTIVES

  • In-depth and practical understanding of Safety Assessment Analysis Methods
  • In-depth knowledge of FDAL and IDAL allocation technique
  • Learn industry-best practices
  • Leverage the experience of 100+ successful concluded projects and +15,000 worked hours in the aerospace industry

 ARP4761 & ARP4754 Extended

In this extended course, the focus is placed more on a practical approach to develop the Safety Assessment Analysis Methods and implement the FDAL and IDAL allocation techniques. Several activities are prepared for this purpose.

STRUCTURE
1 In-depth Safety Analysis Methods 2h 30min
2 FDAL and IDAL allocation 1h 30min
CONTENT

In-depth Safety Analysis Methods

In-depth knowledge of the diverse safety analyses methods available: FTA, Markov Analysis, Dependence Diagram, FMEA, FMES, Zonal Safety Analysis, Particular Risk Analysis, and Common Mode Analysis

FDAL and IDAL allocation
Detailed methods (with practical example) to allocate FDAL/IDAL according to DO-254

ACTIVITIES

ACTIVITY 1: Development of an FTA/DD for an ATA 24 (Electrical) system*

ACTIVITY 2: Development of a typical Common Mode Analysis using the FTA produced in Activity 1*

ACTIVITY 3: Development of a typical Fire Particular Risk Assessment

ACTIVITY 4: FDAL/IDAL allocation using the FTA produced in Activity 1*

*The example system can be adapted to students’ industry and requirements on previous request

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Basic

  • ARP4761: Guidelines and methods for conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil
    airborne systems and equipment
  • ARP4754A: Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems

Auxiliary

  • DO-178C: Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification
  • DO-254: Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware
  • NUREG-0492: Fault Tree Handbook

MAIN OBJECTIVES

  • Master the gathering and application of safety engineering conclusions to design architecture for critical aerospace systems
  • Thorough and practical understanding of the Safety substantiation activities linked to final
    certification
  • In-depth understanding of certification entity expectations from Safety documents linked to the various phases of system design: from prototype to frozen design.
  • Insights from industry experience (more than 20,000 hours in successful projects) to develop solid safety documentation
Relationship between aerospace design phases and safety engineering analyses

Safety Cycle (FHA, PSSA, SSA & ASA)

The safety cycle is composed, at least, by the main safety assessments: Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA), Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA), and the System Safety Assessment (SSA) if the assessment is at system level, or Aircraft Safety Assessment (ASA) if the assessment is at aircraft level.

Certification entities expect from design companies in the aerospace industry a minute and thorough approach to safety assurance. There is flexibility in the type of analyses provided, but each decision must be justified to design specific requirements. Within this course, an experience-proven approach to safety substantiation is given, highlighting pitfalls to avoid and providing a solid timeline for safety activities following the main design milestones.

STRUCTURE
1 Introduction 1h
2 PSSA 1h 30min
3 SSA / ASA 1h 30min
CONTENT

Introduction
Relationship between ARP4761 & ARP4754A. Feedback from DO-178C and DO-254.

PSSA
Definition of an industry proven Safety cycle, including methods and timeline. Overview of main documents contents & structure (FHA, PSSA, SSA & ASA).

Development of the Preliminary System Safety assessment. Analysing the failure conditions, define the safety requirements, and develop RMS contribution to the design. Common Cause analyses and strategies to solve Single Point of Failures.

SSA / ASA
Development of the System Safety assessment, Verify the safety requirements and build the compliance cross matrix.

ACTIVITIES

ACTIVITY 1: Development of the critical chapters of a Preliminary Systems Safety
Assessment for an ATA 24 (Electrical) System*.
Discussion of best iteration routes to refine the safety of the design
after preliminary analysis

ACTIVITY 2: Development of a System Safety Assessment of a modified ATA 24
(Electrical) System* according to conclusions from Activity 1.
Discussion of technical reporting aspects to gain solid safety assurance
and substantiation

*The example system can be adapted to students’ industry and requirements on previous request

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Basic

  • ARP4761: Guidelines and methods for conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil
    airborne systems and equipment
  • ARP4754A: Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems

Auxiliary

  • “Aircraft System Safety” – Duane Kritzinger – Woodhead Publishing, 2016

MAIN OBJECTIVES

  • Goals of the FTA within the safety cycle and its relationship with other safety analyses
  • Clarification of industry standard terms, symbology and usage in context
  • Understand the different ways to calculate the Unavailability of the primary events and highlight the difference between dormancy and hidden events
  • Evaluate the existing calculation algorithms for probability and their adequacy to system types
  • Extract valuable conclusions for design teams from FTA
Relationship between aerospace design phases and safety engineering analyses

Fault Tree Analysis

The FTA is a top-down, deductive failure analysis in which an undesired state of a system is analysed using Boolean logic gates to combine a series of lower-level events. The basic events of the FTA are, usually, taken from the FMECA analysis of the system components. The FTA of each subsystem is associated with the rest of the component system of the whole aircraft.

STRUCTURE
1 Introduction 30min
2 Main definitions & symbology 30min
3 Main objective & steps of FTA 30min
4 FTA construction. Main nodes used in the FTA 45min
5 Unavailability of the Primary Events. Types of calculation 30min
6 Qualitative and quantitative analysis of FTA 30min
7 Extract conclusions from FTA.
Introduction to CMA.
45min
CONTENT

Introduction
Explain what is the FTA and what is the relationship with the other safety analyses like FMECA, FHA, SSA…

Main definitions & symbology
Definition of the main concepts of the FTA and the symbology used to develop the analysis.

Main objective & steps of FTA
Main objective the FTA and development of steps/process to build system’s FTAs. Structure of complex projects.

FTA construction. Main nodes used in the FTA
Learn how to develop an FTA with schematics and FMECA as inputs. In-depth knowledge about the different types of nodes used in this analysis. Pitfalls to avoid to effectively reproduce system failure behaviour.

Unavailability of the Primary Events. Types of calculation
Understand the different types of calculation of the unavailability. Obtain the unavailability from FR and MTBF. Understand the difference between dormancy and hidden events.

Qualitative and quantitative analysis of FTA.
Learn the qualitative analysis of the FTA, like the cut sets analysis, and the quantitative analyses.
Understand the two types of quantitative analysis:

  • Exact method calculation
  • MCS calculation

Extract conclusions from FTA. Introduction to CMA
Learn how to extract the main conclusions from the FTA. Identify Single Points of Failure (SPF) from the cut sets analysis.
Introduction to the Common Mode Analysis (CMA) and how to extract the information needed from the FTA.

 

ACTIVITIES
ACTIVITY 1: Development of an FTA for an ATA 24 (Electrical) system* in Robin from
an already existing FMECA.

*The example system can be adapted to students’ industry and requirements on previous request

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Basic

  • NUREG-0492: Fault Tree Handbook
  • CIVE240: Fault Tree Analysis

MAIN OBJECTIVES

  • Gain practical understanding of Hazards classification
  • In-depth knowledge of FDAL and IDAL allocation technique
  • Learn industry-best practices
  • Leverage the experience of 100+ successful concluded projects and +15,000 worked hours in the aerospace industry
Relationship between aerospace design phases and safety engineering analyses

Hazard Log

A hazard log is a record keeping tool applied to tracking all hazard analysis, risk assessment and risk reduction activities for the whole-of-life of a safety-related system. The Hazard Log is a fundamental tool to track mitigations applied to life-cycle risk discoveries, from prototyping through the whole service until final disposal.

In this course, a methodical an organized approach is given to risk assessment for hazards to health, safety and the environment and a system for logging and tracking mitigations in order to generate a coherent, comprehensive database that works as a living tool to track safety improvements thorough the aerospace system’s life-cycle.

STRUCTURE
1 Hazard Log: why, when and who? 15min
2 Hazard Analysis 1h
3 HAZOP 45min
4 Hazard Log Database 30min
5 Problematic Substances 1h
6 HRI, Residual Risk and Risk Acceptance 30min
CONTENT

Introduction
Explain what is the FTA and what is the relationship with the other safety analyses like FMECA, FHA, SSA…

Hazard Log: why, when and who?
Hazard Log in the aerospace context. Evaluation of safety outcomes, compliance and measures of hazard control.

Hazard Analysis
A description of methods and techniques used to conduct the hazard analysis, including assumptions made, qualitative and quantitative data used, and means to provide traceability to the source data.

HAZOP
Identification of possible hazards in maintenance and operation processes. Effects of variation. Failure Points.

Hazard Log Database
Parametrization and classification of hazards. Understanding context and operations for a workable Hazard Log.

Problematic Substances
Rules & regulations applicable to problematic substances classification. Labelling and authorized usage.

HRI, Residual Risk and Risk Acceptance
Quantitative and qualitative criteria to define an acceptable level of risk.

ACTIVITIES
ACTIVITY 1: Hazard Analysis development for an ATA 24 (Electrical) system* in different operational environments

ACTIVITY 2: Classification, labelling and usage procedures for 3 example Problematic Substances

ACTIVITY 3: Classification and justification of acceptable level of residual risk using the HAZOP results produced in Activity 1*

*The example system can be adapted to students’ industry and requirements on previous request

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Basic

  • ECAST Guidance on Hazards Identification
  • Regulation (EU) No 376/2014: Reporting, Analysis and Follow-up of Occurrences in Civil Aviation
  • Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014: Continuing Airworthiness
  • ICAO Safety Management Manual, Fourth Edition – 2018 (Doc 9859-AN/474)

MAIN OBJECTIVES

  • Practical understanding of the REACH and RoHS regulatory framework
  • Tools to classify products by types and materials and assign compliance actions required for each
  • Learn industry best practices in regards to compliance and risks of non-compliance
  • Leverage the value of on-hands experience of REACH and RoHS consulting within aerospace industry companies
REACH ROHS Engineering Aerospace

REACH / ROHS

 

REACH and ROHS are European level regulations affecting the inclusion of Chemicals and Hazardous Substances in products manufactured, used or sold within the EU. In this course, an overview of the application of REACH and ROHS regulations is given, focusing on integrator companies intending to sell their products in Europe. The course draws the roadmap to build strong processes in aerospace systems companies to provide a turnkey compliant product for customers in the EU.

STRUCTURE
1 Regulation overview 15min
2 REACH: Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals 1h 30min
3 RoHS Directive: Restriction of Hazardous Substances in Electronical and Electrical Equipment 30min
4 Obligations for Downstream Users and Distributers in the EU 1h 45min
CONTENT

Regulation overview
Overview of international regulations for all types of Hazardous Materials and Problematic Substances, including labelling, transport and usage. REACH and RoHS in context.

REACH: Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals
Understand the different roles in the supply chain with regard to REACH compliance. Classification of substances according to REACH Registry. Annex XVII (Restricted List), Annex XIV (Authorisation List) & Candidate List. Tools for substance identification.

RoHS Directive: Restriction of Hazardous Substances in Electronical and Electrical Equipment Applicability to Electronics and Electronical Equipment.
Overview of Directive 2002/95/EC (RoHS 1) amended by 2011/65/EU (RoHS 2) & Directive 2015/863. RoHS and CE marking. Obligations of RoHS equipment suppliers.

Obligations for Downstream Users and Distributers in the EU
Obligations regarding documentation linked to articles, substances and mixtures. Storage and safe usage, risk exposure management. Penalties in case of non-compliance.

ACTIVITIES

ACTIVITY 1: Understand, classify and collect required data for a substance, a mixture, an article and a piece of electronic equipment.

ACTIVITY 2: Analysis of an aerospace system BOM: classify parts and assign compliance action for each.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Basic

  • Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006: Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals
  • Directive 2002/95/EC: Restriction of the use of certain hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment
  • Directive 2011/65/EU: RoHS 2 recast
  • Directive 2015/863: RoHS 3, addition of four restricted substances to RoHS 2

MAIN OBJECTIVES

  • Understand FRACAS for real-world applications in the industry
  • Clarify specific terms in reliability to avoid confusion with similar concepts
  • Understand the value of a complete FRACAS process for the different actors of the aerospace industry
  • Evaluate the effort of applying to FRACAS process to your particular case
Relationship between aerospace design phases and safety engineering analyses

FRACAS

FRACAS (Failure reporting, Analysis, and Corrective Action System) records the problems related to a product or process and their associated root causes and failure analyses to assist in identifying and implementing corrective actions.

To develop and implement a FRACAS is an essential requirement to get the Type Certificate. The manufacturer has to demonstrate to EASA (or FAA) that it has a fully implemented FRACAS to record all the defects related to the aircraft.

STRUCTURE
1 Introduction 30min
2 Main definitions 30min
3 Main objective & Process of FRACAS 1h
4 FRACAS Database 30min
5 Reliability Assessment 45min
6 Corrective Actions 45min
CONTENT

Introduction
What is FRACAS? The importance of FRACAS in the aeronautical sector and industry actors involved.

Main definitions
Definition of the main concepts in FRACAS:

  • Sources of data: AMR / DIR / Failure report
  • Distinction between reported anomalies: Malfunction, defect, failure, no fault found, etc.
  • Reliability concepts: MTBF, MTBUR, MTBCF, PMTBF, GMTBF, MTTF

Main objective & Process of FRACAS
Goals and benefits of implementing a FRACAS. Insights derived of a FRACAS process for aerospace systems.
Overview of the complete process of FRACAS and the importance of each role in this process.

FRACAS Database
Hands-on development of the main fields that a FRACAS database should have in order to perform valuable analyses.

Reliability Assessment
Insights in a reliability assessment and organization of conceptual conclusions according to goals. Understanding of the results obtained.

Corrective Actions
Application and adequacy of corrective actions. Understand the importance of the corrective actions and how it could be beneficial to the aircraft manufacturer.

ACTIVITIES

ACTIVITY 1: Failure reporting: classification and data introduction of an AMR, a DIR and a field failure report to avoid data error

ACTIVITY 2: Development of a Reliability Assessment in Robin and extract main conclusions. Identification of CA impact in the MTBF parameter

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Basic

  • MIL-STD-2155: Failure reporting, Analysis and Corrective Action taken

Auxiliary

  • AIAA Standard: Performance-Based Failure Reporting, Analysis & Corrective Action System (FRACAS) Requirements

MAIN OBJECTIVES

  • Understand the importance of reliability in the aerospace industry context and clarify Reliability Theory concepts
  • Learn how to use different electronic and non-electronic predictions standards
  • Learn industry best practices related to reliability data assumptions for both new designs and system modifications
  • Leverage the experience of 100+ successful concluded projects and +15,000 worked hours in the aerospace industry
Reliability Prediction RPA RAMS

RPA

Reliability is a primary key for high operational readiness and has a significant impact on mission success of any equipment. It is defined as the probability of a system to remain failure free during a specified interval.  A Reliability Prediction Analysis can be performed following rules from standards or by using historical data.

STRUCTURE
1 Introduction to Reliability 15min
2 Reliability Modelling and Prediction theorical concepts 1h
3 Overview of the available Prediction Standards 30min
4 Prediction calculations 1h 15min
5 Reliability Historical data 15min
6 Reliability Prediction Analysis 45min
CONTENT

Introduction to Reliability
Importance of reliability and historical evolution. Reliability for aerospace.

Reliability Modelling and Prediction theorical concepts
General procedure for prediction calculations. Basic mathematical models and reliability modelling. Methodologies such as Reliability Block Diagrams, Failure Distributions, Environmental Data and Mathematical/Simulation models will be discussed.

Overview of the available Prediction Standards
Overview, applicability and scope of the different available Reliability Prediction Standards.

Prediction calculations
Calculation methodology for the following standards:

  • MIL-HDBK-217F (Including specific topics related to environment and temperature dependence)
    • ANSI-VITA specification application
  • RIAC-HDBK-217Plus
  • FIDES 2009 (Including specific topics related to the standard as definition of mission phases, computation of Pi factors or phase dependant parameters importance)
  • NSWC-11 for non-electronic parts.

For each standard, component categorization and scope are discussed.

Reliability Historical data
Overview and applicability of the NPRD2016 and EPRD2014 databases.

Reliability Prediction Analysis
Evaluation of reliability requirements in design specifications. Sections and methodology for conducting an RPA. Interpretation of results and detection of possible flaws in the design.

 

ACTIVITIES

ACTIVITY 1: Perform prediction calculations for each discussed standard (MIL-HDBK-217F, RIAC-HDBK-217Plus, FIDES2009 and NSWC-11) with the aid of Robin RPA

ACTIVITY 2: Perform a complete Reliability Prediction Analysis for a Simple Electronic System* using Robin RPA

*The example system can be adapted to students’ industry and requirements on previous request

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Basic

  • MIL-HDBK-217F: Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment
  • ANSI-VITA: American National Standard for Reliability Prediction MIL-HDBK-217 Subsidiary Specification.
  • RIAC-HDBK-217Plus: Handbook of 217Plus™ Reliability Prediction Models
  • FIDES 2009: FIDES guide 2009 Reliability Methodology for Electronic Systems
  • NSWC-11: Handbook of Reliability Prediction Procedures for Mechanical Equipment
  • MIL-HDBK-338B: Electronic Reliability Design Handbook

Auxiliary

  • “Case Studies in Reliability and Maintenance” – Wallace R. Blischked & N. Prabhakar Murthy – Wiley Interscience
  • Alessandro Birolini, “Reliability Engineering: Theory and Practice”, Eight Edition

MAIN OBJECTIVES

  • Get an overview of the benefits of Reliability Centred Maintenance methodologies for the life-cycle cost, efficiency and availability of aerospace systems
  • Learn how to use the standard methodologies applied to Maintenance Significant Items to define a preventive maintenance program for an aerospace product
  • Understand the relevance of Zonal Analysis Procedure to group and schedule maintenance tasks
  • Leverage the experience of 100+ successful concluded projects and +15,000 worked hours in the aerospace industry
Relationship between aerospace design phases and safety engineering analyses

MSG-3 / RCM

The objective of the MSG-3 is to present means for developing the scheduled maintenance tasks and intervals which need to be acceptable to the authorities. MSG-3 is of great utility for determining scheduled maintenance requirements during the life of the aircraft, component or aerospace system.

There are mainly four types of scheduled maintenance according to the MSG-3 document:

  • Aircraft Systems/Powerplant (MSI) Analyses: The MSIs are identified and the analyses are usually grouped by ATA chapters. The objective of this analysis is to define scheduled maintenance task for the MSI.
  • Zonal Analyses: It requires an analysis of each zone on the aircraft. These analyses enable appropriate attention to electrical wiring, plumbing or ducting installations.
  • L/HIRF Analyses: These analyses try to reduce the possibility of a single failure cause (e.g. lighting strike) or a common failure cause.
STRUCTURE
1 MSG-3 / RCM 30min
2 MSI Analysis 1h 30min
3 Zonal Analysis Procedure 1h 30min
4 L/HIRF Analysis 30min
CONTENT

MSG-3/RCM
Brief introduction to RCM and MSG-3 methodologies.

MSI Analysis
In-depth knowledge of the MSI Analysis process. Identification of the MSI and the further analysis. Definition of the failure modes.

Zonal Analysis
Procedure Detailed process explanation of the Zonal Analysis.

L/HIRF Analysis
Theorical overview of L/HIRF Analysis.

ACTIVITIES

ACTIVITY 1: Development of an MSI Analysis for an ATA 27 (Flight Control) system*

ACTIVITY 2: Development of a Zonal Analysis Procedure for an ATA 32 (Landing Gear) system*

*The example system can be adapted to students’ industry and requirements on previous request

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Basic

  • ATA MSG-3: Operator/Manufacturer Scheduled Maintenance Development

Auxiliary

  • “Case Studies in Reliability and Maintenance” – Wallace R. Blischked & N. Prabhakar Murthy – Wiley Interscience

MAIN OBJECTIVES

  • Understand the philosophy behind the different FMECA approaches (functional and piece-part).
  • Learn the link between Reliability Prediction Analysis (RPA), FMECA, and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA).
  • Understand how to improve the reliability of your designs by focusing the effort on mitigating the most probable failure modes.
  • Learn by doing. By providing real examples and adopted solutions to problems in the past.
  • Understand which inputs are necessary to correctly develop an FMECA analysis.
Relationship between aerospace design phases and safety engineering analyses

FMEA / FMECA

The FMECA is a bottom-up analysis performed on an item, system or function with the aim to identify their potential failure modes and the effects on the next higher level. It might be conducted at several levels, e.g. piece-part FMECA, functional FMECA.

FMECA is the foundation of system analysis for the RAMS discipline and the fundamental input for the Fault Tree Analyses. The aim of this course is to set the knowledge for a successful implementation of FMECA for aerospace systems that allows a practical continuation of the related RAMS analyses. Consistent definition of failure modes is essential to safety analyses. Criticality definition is crucial for FHA. Detectability and means of detection are the first step towards design for availability.

 

STRUCTURE
1 Introduction 30min
2 FMECA 1h 45min
3 Detection Coverage 45min
4 FMES & Candidate Critical Item List 30min
5 Recommendations and safety requirements 30min
CONTENT

Introduction
Basic concepts and definitions of the FMECA analysis

FMECA
Methodology and recommendations for each FMECA field (e.g. Local Effect, Next Effect, End Effect…). Real examples of different types of FMEA

  • Functional vs piece-part FMECA
  • Qualitative vs Quantitative FMECA
  • Structural vs LRU FMECA
  • Data source for failure rate
  • Failure modes distribution

Detection Coverage
Definition of the different types of detection (PBIT, CBIT, IBIT, maintenance, pilot…). Computation of the detection coverage according to the phases and effects of each Failure Mode. Acceptable detection requirements for the aerospace industry. Calculation of false alarm ratios.

FMES & Candidate Critical Item List
FMES obtention after FMECA completion. Analysis of the most critical end effects and most influencing items and failure modes. Candidate Critical Item List. How to draw conclusions from an FMECA

Recommendations and safety requirements
Recommendations for system engineers derived from the FMECA (e.g. fail-safe demonstration, dual check reuqired, critical characteristic investigation). Safety requirements.Final tips to perform a good FMECA. Detection of possible flaws

ACTIVITIES

ACTIVITY 1: Development of a complete FMECA analysis for an ATA 24 (Electrical) system* in Robin FMECA

*The example system can be adapted to students’ industry and requirements on previous request

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Basic

  • ARP4761: Guidelines and methods for conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil airborne systems and equipmen
  • FMD-2016: Failure Mode Mechanisms Distribution, Quanterion

Auxiliary

  • Guidelines for Failure Mode and Effects Analysis for Automotive, Aerospace and General Manufacturing Industries, Dyadem Press. ISBN: 0849319080
  • Product Excellence Using Six Sigma. Failure Modes, Effects & Criticality Analysis. Warwink Manufacturing Group

MAIN OBJECTIVES

  • Understand the increasing importance of Aircraft Cybersecurity
  • Learn how to perform a Security Risk Assessment
  • Conduct Security Verifications
  • Learn industry best practices
  • Leverage the experience of 100+ successful concluded projects and +15,000 worked hours in the aerospace industry
Relationship between aerospace design phases and safety engineering analyses

Cybersecurity

Aircraft systems and parts are increasingly connected and, hence, susceptible to security threats. The purpose of Aircraft Cybersecurity analyses is to mitigate the safety effects caused by potential cybersecurity threats and handle the threat of intentional unauthorized electronic interaction to aircraft safety. This training also considers the interdependencies between Safety and Security.

STRUCTURE
1 History of Cybersecurity 15min
2 Applicable and related regulation 45min
3 Development Process 15min
4 Security Risk Assessment 2h
5 Security Verification and Continued Airworthiness 45min
CONTENT

History of Cybersecurity
Background explaining the beginning and evolution of Airworthiness Cybersecurity, specially centred in EASA

Applicable and related regulation
Amendments performed in Certification Specifications by EASA & FAA. Requirements specified by DO-178C

Development Process
Steps and processes to follow to comply with ED-202 standard. Interdependencies between Safety and Security

Security Risk Assessment
Sections and methodology for performing a SRA. Numerical evaluation of level threat according ED-203A

Security Verification and Continued Airworthiness
Security, Robustness and Vulnerability Tests. Cybersecurity in Continued Airworthiness according to ED-204.

ACTIVITIES

ACTIVITY 1: Perform a Security Risk Assessment for a WiFi equipment*

*The example system can be adapted to students’ industry and requirements on previous request

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Basic

  • ED-202A: Airworthiness Security Process Specification
  • ED-203A: Airworthiness Security Methods and Considerations
  • ED-204: Information Security Guidance for Continuing Airworthiness

Auxiliary

  • DO-178C: Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification

Contact Us

Carrer Municipi 14, Barcelona, Spain

(+34) 633 259 805
(+41) 78 943 14 34

Back to top