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ACTIVITY 1: Development of an MSI Analysis for an ATA 27 (Flight Control) system*ACTIVITY 2: Development of a Zonal Analysis Procedure for an ATA 32 (Landing Gear) system*
The objective of the MSG-3 is to present means for developing the scheduled maintenance tasks and intervals which need to be acceptable to the authorities. MSG-3 is of great utility for determining scheduled maintenance requirements during the life of the aircraft, component or aerospace system.There are mainly four types of scheduled maintenance according to the MSG-3 document:Aircraft Systems/Powerplant (MSI) Analyses: The MSIs are identified and the analyses are usually grouped by ATA chapters. The objective of this analysis is to define scheduled maintenance task for the MSI.Zonal Analyses: It requires an analysis of each zone on the aircraft. These analyses enable appropriate attention to electrical wiring, plumbing or ducting installations.L/HIRF Analyses: These analyses try to reduce the possibility of a single failure cause (e.g. lighting strike) or a common failure cause.
ATA MSG-3: Operator/Manufacturer Scheduled Maintenance Development
ACTIVITY 1: Development of an MSI Analysis for an ATA 27 (Flight Control) system*ACTIVITY 2: Development of a Zonal Analysis Procedure for an ATA 32 (Landing Gear) system*
The objective of the MSG-3 is to present means for developing the scheduled maintenance tasks and intervals which need to be acceptable to the authorities. MSG-3 is of great utility for determining scheduled maintenance requirements during the life of the aircraft, component or aerospace system.There are mainly four types of scheduled maintenance according to the MSG-3 document:Aircraft Systems/Powerplant (MSI) Analyses: The MSIs are identified and the analyses are usually grouped by ATA chapters. The objective of this analysis is to define scheduled maintenance task for the MSI.Zonal Analyses: It requires an analysis of each zone on the aircraft. These analyses enable appropriate attention to electrical wiring, plumbing or ducting installations.L/HIRF Analyses: These analyses try to reduce the possibility of a single failure cause (e.g. lighting strike) or a common failure cause.
ATA MSG-3: Operator/Manufacturer Scheduled Maintenance Development
ACTIVITY 1: Failure reporting: classification and data introduction of an AMR, a DIR and a field failure report to avoid data errorACTIVITY 2: Development of a Reliability Assessment in Robin and extract main conclusions. Identification of CA impact in the MTBF parameter
FRACAS (Failure reporting, Analysis, and Corrective Action System) records the problems related to a product or process and their associated root causes and failure analyses to assist in identifying and implementing corrective actions.To develop and implement a FRACAS is an essential requirement to get the Type Certificate. The manufacturer has to demonstrate to EASA (or FAA) that it has a fully implemented FRACAS to record all the defects related to the aircraft.
MIL-STD-2155: Failure reporting, Analysis and Corrective Action taken
ACTIVITY 1: Failure reporting: classification and data introduction of an AMR, a DIR and a field failure report to avoid data errorACTIVITY 2: Development of a Reliability Assessment in Robin and extract main conclusions. Identification of CA impact in the MTBF parameter
FRACAS (Failure reporting, Analysis, and Corrective Action System) records the problems related to a product or process and their associated root causes and failure analyses to assist in identifying and implementing corrective actions.To develop and implement a FRACAS is an essential requirement to get the Type Certificate. The manufacturer has to demonstrate to EASA (or FAA) that it has a fully implemented FRACAS to record all the defects related to the aircraft.
MIL-STD-2155: Failure reporting, Analysis and Corrective Action taken
ACTIVITY 1: Development of a complete FMECA analysis for an ATA 24 (Electrical) system* in Robin FMECA
The FMECA is a bottom-up analysis performed on an item, system or function with the aim to identify their potential failure modes and the effects on the next higher level. It might be conducted at several levels, e.g. piece-part FMECA, functional FMECA.FMECA is the foundation of system analysis for the RAMS discipline and the fundamental input for the Fault Tree Analyses. The aim of this course is to set the knowledge for a successful implementation of FMECA for aerospace systems that allows a practical continuation of the related RAMS analyses. Consistent definition of failure modes is essential to safety analyses. Criticality definition is crucial for FHA. Detectability and means of detection are the first step towards design for availability.
ARP4761: Guidelines and methods for conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil airborne systems and equipmen FMD-2016: Failure Mode Mechanisms Distribution, Quanterion
ACTIVITY 1: Development of a complete FMECA analysis for an ATA 24 (Electrical) system* in Robin FMECA
The FMECA is a bottom-up analysis performed on an item, system or function with the aim to identify their potential failure modes and the effects on the next higher level. It might be conducted at several levels, e.g. piece-part FMECA, functional FMECA.FMECA is the foundation of system analysis for the RAMS discipline and the fundamental input for the Fault Tree Analyses. The aim of this course is to set the knowledge for a successful implementation of FMECA for aerospace systems that allows a practical continuation of the related RAMS analyses. Consistent definition of failure modes is essential to safety analyses. Criticality definition is crucial for FHA. Detectability and means of detection are the first step towards design for availability.
ARP4761: Guidelines and methods for conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil airborne systems and equipmen FMD-2016: Failure Mode Mechanisms Distribution, Quanterion
ACTIVITY 1: Perform a Security Risk Assessment for a WiFi equipment*
Aircraft systems and parts are increasingly connected and, hence, susceptible to security threats. The purpose of Aircraft Cybersecurity analyses is to mitigate the safety effects caused by potential cybersecurity threats and handle the threat of intentional unauthorized electronic interaction to aircraft safety. This training also considers the interdependencies between Safety and Security.
ED-202A: Airworthiness Security Process Specification ED-203A: Airworthiness Security Methods and Considerations ED-204: Information Security Guidance for Continuing Airworthiness
ACTIVITY 1: Perform a Security Risk Assessment for a WiFi equipment*
Aircraft systems and parts are increasingly connected and, hence, susceptible to security threats. The purpose of Aircraft Cybersecurity analyses is to mitigate the safety effects caused by potential cybersecurity threats and handle the threat of intentional unauthorized electronic interaction to aircraft safety. This training also considers the interdependencies between Safety and Security.
ED-202A: Airworthiness Security Process Specification ED-203A: Airworthiness Security Methods and Considerations ED-204: Information Security Guidance for Continuing Airworthiness
ACTIVITY 1: Perform prediction calculations for each discussed standard (MIL-HDBK-217F, RIAC-HDBK-217Plus, FIDES2009 and NSWC-11) with the aid of Robin RPAACTIVITY 2: Perform a complete Reliability Prediction Analysis for a Simple Electronic System* using Robin RPA
Reliability is a primary key for high operational readiness and has a significant impact on mission success of any equipment. It is defined as the probability of a system to remain failure free during a specified interval. A Reliability Prediction Analysis can be performed following rules from standards or by using historical data.
MIL-HDBK-217F: Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment ANSI-VITA: American National Standard for Reliability Prediction MIL-HDBK-217 Subsidiary Specification. RIAC-HDBK-217Plus: Handbook of 217Plus� Reliability Prediction Models FIDES 2009: FIDES guide 2009 Reliability Methodology for Electronic Systems NSWC-11: Handbook of Reliability Prediction Procedures for Mechanical Equipment MIL-HDBK-338B: Electronic Reliability Design Handbook
ACTIVITY 1: Perform prediction calculations for each discussed standard (MIL-HDBK-217F, RIAC-HDBK-217Plus, FIDES2009 and NSWC-11) with the aid of Robin RPAACTIVITY 2: Perform a complete Reliability Prediction Analysis for a Simple Electronic System* using Robin RPA
Reliability is a primary key for high operational readiness and has a significant impact on mission success of any equipment. It is defined as the probability of a system to remain failure free during a specified interval. A Reliability Prediction Analysis can be performed following rules from standards or by using historical data.
MIL-HDBK-217F: Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment ANSI-VITA: American National Standard for Reliability Prediction MIL-HDBK-217 Subsidiary Specification. RIAC-HDBK-217Plus: Handbook of 217Plus� Reliability Prediction Models FIDES 2009: FIDES guide 2009 Reliability Methodology for Electronic Systems NSWC-11: Handbook of Reliability Prediction Procedures for Mechanical Equipment MIL-HDBK-338B: Electronic Reliability Design Handbook
ACTIVITY 1: Hazard Analysis development for an ATA 24 (Electrical) system* in different operational environmentsACTIVITY 2: Classification, labelling and usage procedures for 3 example Problematic SubstancesACTIVITY 3: Classification and justification of acceptable level of residual risk using the HAZOP results produced in Activity 1*
A hazard log is a record keeping tool applied to tracking all hazard analysis, risk assessment and risk reduction activities for the whole-of-life of a safety-related system. The Hazard Log is a fundamental tool to track mitigations applied to life-cycle risk discoveries, from prototyping through the whole service until final disposal.In this course, a methodical an organized approach is given to risk assessment for hazards to health, safety and the environment and a system for logging and tracking mitigations in order to generate a coherent, comprehensive database that works as a living tool to track safety improvements thorough the aerospace system�s life-cycle.
ECAST Guidance on Hazards Identification Regulation (EU) No 376/2014: Reporting, Analysis and Follow-up of Occurrences in Civil Aviation Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014: Continuing Airworthiness ICAO Safety Management Manual, Fourth Edition � 2018 (Doc 9859-AN/474)
ACTIVITY 1: Hazard Analysis development for an ATA 24 (Electrical) system* in different operational environmentsACTIVITY 2: Classification, labelling and usage procedures for 3 example Problematic SubstancesACTIVITY 3: Classification and justification of acceptable level of residual risk using the HAZOP results produced in Activity 1*
A hazard log is a record keeping tool applied to tracking all hazard analysis, risk assessment and risk reduction activities for the whole-of-life of a safety-related system. The Hazard Log is a fundamental tool to track mitigations applied to life-cycle risk discoveries, from prototyping through the whole service until final disposal.In this course, a methodical an organized approach is given to risk assessment for hazards to health, safety and the environment and a system for logging and tracking mitigations in order to generate a coherent, comprehensive database that works as a living tool to track safety improvements thorough the aerospace system�s life-cycle.
ECAST Guidance on Hazards Identification Regulation (EU) No 376/2014: Reporting, Analysis and Follow-up of Occurrences in Civil Aviation Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014: Continuing Airworthiness ICAO Safety Management Manual, Fourth Edition � 2018 (Doc 9859-AN/474)
ACTIVITY 1: Understand, classify and collect required data for a substance, a mixture, an article and a piece of electronic equipment.ACTIVITY 2: Analysis of an aerospace system BOM: classify parts and assign compliance action for each.
REACH and ROHS are European level regulations affecting the inclusion of Chemicals and Hazardous Substances in products manufactured, used or sold within the EU. In this course, an overview of the application of REACH and ROHS regulations is given, focusing on integrator companies intending to sell their products in Europe. The course draws the roadmap to build strong processes in aerospace systems companies to provide a turnkey compliant product for customers in the EU.
Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006: Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals Directive 2002/95/EC: Restriction of the use of certain hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment Directive 2011/65/EU: RoHS 2 recast Directive 2015/863: RoHS 3, addition of four restricted substances to RoHS 2
ACTIVITY 1: Understand, classify and collect required data for a substance, a mixture, an article and a piece of electronic equipment.ACTIVITY 2: Analysis of an aerospace system BOM: classify parts and assign compliance action for each.
REACH and ROHS are European level regulations affecting the inclusion of Chemicals and Hazardous Substances in products manufactured, used or sold within the EU. In this course, an overview of the application of REACH and ROHS regulations is given, focusing on integrator companies intending to sell their products in Europe. The course draws the roadmap to build strong processes in aerospace systems companies to provide a turnkey compliant product for customers in the EU.
Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006: Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals Directive 2002/95/EC: Restriction of the use of certain hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment Directive 2011/65/EU: RoHS 2 recast Directive 2015/863: RoHS 3, addition of four restricted substances to RoHS 2
ACTIVITY 1: Development of an FTA for an ATA 24 (Electrical) system* in Robin from an already existing FMECA.
The FTA is a top-down, deductive failure analysis in which an undesired state of a system is analysed using Boolean logic gates to combine a series of lower-level events. The basic events of the FTA are, usually, taken from the FMECA analysis of the system components. The FTA of each subsystem is associated with the rest of the component system of the whole aircraft.
NUREG-0492: Fault Tree Handbook CIVE240: Fault Tree Analysis
ACTIVITY 1: Development of an FTA for an ATA 24 (Electrical) system* in Robin from an already existing FMECA.
The FTA is a top-down, deductive failure analysis in which an undesired state of a system is analysed using Boolean logic gates to combine a series of lower-level events. The basic events of the FTA are, usually, taken from the FMECA analysis of the system components. The FTA of each subsystem is associated with the rest of the component system of the whole aircraft.
NUREG-0492: Fault Tree Handbook CIVE240: Fault Tree Analysis
ACTIVITY 1: Development of an FTA/DD for an ATA 24 (Electrical) system*ACTIVITY 2: Development of a typical Common Mode Analysis using the FTA produced in Activity 1*ACTIVITY 3: Development of a typical Fire Particular Risk AssessmentACTIVITY 4: FDAL/IDAL allocation using the FTA produced in Activity 1*
In this extended course, the focus is placed more on a practical approach to develop the Safety Assessment Analysis Methods and implement the FDAL and IDAL allocation techniques. Several activities are prepared for this purpose.
ARP4761: Guidelines and methods for conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil airborne systems and equipment ARP4754A: Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems
ACTIVITY 1: Development of an FTA/DD for an ATA 24 (Electrical) system*ACTIVITY 2: Development of a typical Common Mode Analysis using the FTA produced in Activity 1*ACTIVITY 3: Development of a typical Fire Particular Risk AssessmentACTIVITY 4: FDAL/IDAL allocation using the FTA produced in Activity 1*
In this extended course, the focus is placed more on a practical approach to develop the Safety Assessment Analysis Methods and implement the FDAL and IDAL allocation techniques. Several activities are prepared for this purpose.
ARP4761: Guidelines and methods for conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil airborne systems and equipment ARP4754A: Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems
ACTIVITY 1: Development of a Functional Hazard Assessment for an ATA 24 (Electrical) System*
The standard ARP4761 gives an accurate overview and description of the methods for performing the safety assessment for certification of civil aircraft. This document provides a systematic approach to most activities in the field of Reliability, Maintainability and Safety, serving as a backbone to structure a first introduction to RAMS analyses for the aerospace industry.
ARP4761: Guidelines and methods for conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil airborne systems and equipment ARP4754A: Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems
ACTIVITY 1: Development of a Functional Hazard Assessment for an ATA 24 (Electrical) System*
The standard ARP4761 gives an accurate overview and description of the methods for performing the safety assessment for certification of civil aircraft. This document provides a systematic approach to most activities in the field of Reliability, Maintainability and Safety, serving as a backbone to structure a first introduction to RAMS analyses for the aerospace industry.
ARP4761: Guidelines and methods for conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil airborne systems and equipment ARP4754A: Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems
ACTIVITY 1: Development of the critical chapters of a Preliminary Systems SafetyAssessment for an ATA 24 (Electrical) System*.Discussion of best iteration routes to refine the safety of the designafter preliminary analysisACTIVITY 2: Development of a System Safety Assessment of a modified ATA 24(Electrical) System* according to conclusions from Activity 1.Discussion of technical reporting aspects to gain solid safety assuranceand substantiation
The safety cycle is composed, at least, by the main safety assessments: Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA), Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA), and the System Safety Assessment (SSA) if the assessment is at system level, or Aircraft Safety Assessment (ASA) if the assessment is at aircraft level.Certification entities expect from design companies in the aerospace industry a minute and thorough approach to safety assurance. There is flexibility in the type of analyses provided, but each decision must be justified to design specific requirements. Within this course, an experience-proven approach to safety substantiation is given, highlighting pitfalls to avoid and providing a solid timeline for safety activities following the main design milestones.
ARP4761: Guidelines and methods for conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil airborne systems and equipment ARP4754A: Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems
ACTIVITY 1: Development of the critical chapters of a Preliminary Systems SafetyAssessment for an ATA 24 (Electrical) System*.Discussion of best iteration routes to refine the safety of the designafter preliminary analysisACTIVITY 2: Development of a System Safety Assessment of a modified ATA 24(Electrical) System* according to conclusions from Activity 1.Discussion of technical reporting aspects to gain solid safety assuranceand substantiation
The safety cycle is composed, at least, by the main safety assessments: Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA), Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA), and the System Safety Assessment (SSA) if the assessment is at system level, or Aircraft Safety Assessment (ASA) if the assessment is at aircraft level.Certification entities expect from design companies in the aerospace industry a minute and thorough approach to safety assurance. There is flexibility in the type of analyses provided, but each decision must be justified to design specific requirements. Within this course, an experience-proven approach to safety substantiation is given, highlighting pitfalls to avoid and providing a solid timeline for safety activities following the main design milestones.
ARP4761: Guidelines and methods for conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil airborne systems and equipment ARP4754A: Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems
The general evaluation is that the work in FRACAS functions properly without any points of worry. The documentation followed, and there was punctuality with the deliverables. DMD Solutions' team is independent, regular and reliable.
We are satisfied with engineering performance & communication. Technical skills are always continously improved with training.
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